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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians living in the
former republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have alleged that their civil
and human rights are being violated. The issue has generated a great deal of
concern from both progressive and conservative elements within the
Russian government. Although Russia has vital military and economic
interests in the Baltic region, and the human rights problem could possibly
play into the hands of those who would use the issue as a pretext for
maintaining a military presence in the area, this thesis will examine the
possibility that the human rights agenda is not so much a cover for
geostrategic interests as it is a political problem that facilitates the Russian
foreign policy for keeping a foothold in the Baltic States. The situation may
also represent a beneficial condition for the Russian military who have been
pressing for support of a foreign policy that would discontinue the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, retain a Russian military
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in former republics once
considered part of the empire, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers now
find themselves on the periphery of the Russian State. In some of these
areas, ethnic Russians have allegedly been subjected to ethnic prejudice and
discrimination.
The plight of ethnic Russians in the former Baltic Republics of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania appear, at least on the surface, to be following a similar
trajectory of prejudice and discrimination as that of their Russian comrades
residing in other former republics.
The issue of human rights violations against ethnic Russians in the
Baltics is a complex matter requiring thoughtful consideration of the
variables at play and a recognition that other, possibly more profound and
certainly more contentious, issues are brewing beneath the surface.
This thesis will argue that the Russian human rights agenda is not
necessarily a cover for geostrategic interests, but a political problem that
facilitates a Russian foreign policy for keeping a foothold in the Baltic States.
The issue may play into the hands of some who would use it as a pretext for
maintaining a military presence, but it also plays into the hands of the
Russian military who have been pressing for support of a foreign policy that
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would discontinue the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, retain a
military presence in the area, and address their interests and concerns.
There are certainly reasons to suspect that discrimination is occurring
in the three Baltic States and for good reason. Ethnic Russians residing in
these countries represent the embodiment of their Soviet oppressors. One
can see why human and civil rights violations such as unfair housing
practices, stiff language requirements for citizenship, and no voting
privileges, in some people's minds, are legitimate political, moral, and ethical
paybacks for the brutal occupation of their countries.
The current Russian government is concerned about the plight of
ethnic Russians living in the Baltics, and numerous diplomatic overtures
and protests have been levied at the Baltic States for these alleged violations.
The governments of the Baltic States have categorically denied that any
organized, government sanctioned form of discrimination is taking place.
They have also refuted Russian accusations as to the perceived severity and
degree of these alleged violations. Therefore, it is possible to speculate about
the veracity of these claims and questions can also be raised about Russian
policies for responding to this issue in the fashion they have responded.
The objective of this thesis is to examine the Russian policy toward
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in conjunction with the alleged discrimination
against ethnic Russians currently living in the Baltics. Specifically, this paper
will explore the validity of these allegations as viewed by the various parties
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involved, and it will discuss possible foreign policy measures that could be
employed by the Russian government in this region.
Comprehending the policies and interests of the Russian government
in their treatment of this issue, may indeed be the cornerstone in laying a
broader foundation for an appreciation of the operational variables through
which the Russian government must perform.
East European stability and security depend upon an awareness of this
problem. By assessing the meaning and consequences that result from
Russia's policies toward the Baltics, international and European organizations
can develop and adopt strategies designed to defuse rising tensions, reconcile
grievances, encourage negotiations, or counter intrusive Russian behavior.
The difficulties faced by ethnic Russians living on the perimeter of
Russia has raised the level of concern in various circles of the Russian
government to a point where, today, it is an issue of enormous political
importance.
Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei Kosyrev, have been
under intense pressure by both conservative and liberal elements of the
government who have criticized their attempts to resolve this issue. This
criticism represents an underlying lack of confidence concerning the issue of
ethnic Russians in the Baltics, and it is symptomatic of even greater problems
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians and Russian
speakers, in former republics once considered part of the empire, now find
themselves outside of the periphery of the Russian State. In some of these
areas, ethnic Russians have allegedly been subjected to ethnic prejudice and
discrimination.
The plight of ethnic Russians in the former Baltic Republics of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania appear, at least on the surface, to be following a similar
trajectory of prejudice and discrimination as that of their Russian comrades
residing in other former republics.
The issue of human rights violations against ethnic Russians in the
Baltics is a complex matter that requires consideration of the many variables
involved and a recognition that other, possibly more profound and certainly
more contentious, issues are brewing beneath the surface.
This thesis will argue that the human rights agenda is not necessarily a
cover for geostrategic interests, but a political problem that facilitates a
Russian foreign policy for keeping a foothold in the Baltic States. Indeed, the
issue may play into the hands of those who would use it as a pretext for
maintaining a military presence, but it also plays into the hands of the
Russian military who have been pressing for support of a foreign policy that
would discontinue the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, retain a
military presence in the area, and address their interests and concerns.
Looking at the issue from a simplistic point of view, one could argue
that there are indeed reasons to suspect that discrimination is occurring in
various degrees of intensity in the three Baltic States, and for good reason.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are nationalistic countries. The citizens
of each state have strong patriotic feelings for their countries and their
heritage of independence and freedom.
Historically, the three states have very little in common. Lithuania is
predominately Catholic, and it was both independent and powerful for
centuries. Independence was not particularly long lived in the other two
Lutheran states of Estonia and Latvia. 1
Prior to World War I, all three countries were dominated, during
different periods, by Swedish, Polish, and Russian rulers. At the end of the
war, all three Baltic States were successful in acquiring independence. In each
case, German occupation forces had to be removed and
Bolshevik/Communist elements were defeated and pushed out.
Independence was achieved, and democratic forms of government were
initiated. 2
Estonian independence was officially recognized by major Western
powers in 1921. Similarly, Latvia achieved full independence by 1922 and
Lithuania by 1920. In each case, their democracies were replaced by
authoritarian rule which lasted until independence was lost on 23 August
1939 with the signing of the USSR/Germany non-aggression treaty (Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact) and the Secret Supplementary Protocol which provided for
the occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and later Lithuania by Soviet troops. 3
Almost immediately the Soviets created an economic upheaval with
the introduction of industrialization and collectivization. Social and political
turmoil existed on a vast human scale that included religious persecution,
deportations by the thousands, and imprisonment and executions of Baltic
citizens that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. This tyranny was
briefly interrupted by German oppression during World War II, but following
the war, Soviet domination resumed in full stride. 4
Various dissident organizations, in each Baltic State, resisted valiantly
against the communist regime, but not until Gorbachev's glasnost did dissent
spread beyond the immediate domain of these groups. The resurgence in
Baltic nationalism, patriotism, and pride resulted in each state taking bold
steps to regain their independence. The Soviet response, although
predictable, declared these attempts at independence unconstitutional. In
January 1991, troops intervened in Latvia and Lithuania in an unsuccessful
attempt to restore order and bring the wayward republics back into the fold,
but by 22 August 1991, with the failed coup, it was evident the Soviet Union
had collapsed. By the end of August, numerous countries had recognized the
Baltic republics as sovereign states. On 4 September, the USSR State Council
recognized the independence of each Baltic State. 5 Today, independence and
democracy are fledgling concepts to the Baltic region. Politicians of the three
nations, recognizing the interdependence upon which their independence
rests, have forged a Baltic Council representing an "embryo" of regional
cooperation.
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Ethnic Russians residing in these countries represent the embodiment
of their Soviet oppressors. One can see why human and civil rights
violations such as unfair housing practices, stiff language requirements for
citizenship, and no voting privileges, in some people's minds, are legitimate
political, moral, and ethical paybacks for the brutal occupation of their
countries.
Naturally, the current Russian government is concerned about the
plight of ethnic Russians living in the Baltics, and numerous diplomatic
overtures and protests have been levied at the Baltic States for these alleged
violations. The governments of the Baltic States have categorically and
repeatedly denied that any organized, systematic, government sanctioned
form of discrimination is taking place. They have also refuted Russian
accusations as to the perceived severity and degree of these alleged violations.
Therefore, it is possible to speculate about the veracity of these claims
given the ethnic Russian grievances and the Baltics resolute defense.
Additionally, questions can also be raised about Russian motives for
responding to this issue in the fashion they have responded.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine the Russian policy toward
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in conjunction with the alleged discrimination
against ethnic Russians currently living in the Baltics. Specifically, this paper
will explore the validity of these allegations as viewed by the various parties
involved. As a result of the research, the paper will propose possible motives
for current Russian involvement and attitudes in this region, and also
discuss foreign policy measures that could be employed by the Russian
government to protect and defend Russian interests vital to its security and
economic well-being.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question revolves around Russian intentions.
Are there elements of the Russian government, such as Foreign Minister
Kosyrev, who are genuinely concerned about a resolution to the alleged
human rights violations of ethnic Russians? Do conservatives, such as State
Counselor Stankevich, wish to maintain a presence in the Baltic region under
the pretense of monitoring the human rights problem, when, in fact, they
wish to remain for military and economic interests which are vital to Russia's
security and economic well-being? Or, is there a confluence of issues that,
when combined, all have a bearing on the formulation of Russian foreign
policy with regard to the Baltic States? Issues to be addressed in conjunction
with the thesis question include:
- The essence of allegations of Ethnic Russian rights violations.
- Voting and citizenship laws for each Baltic State.
- The Baltic States response to these alleged violations.
- The Russian governments response to alleged violations.
- The Russian governments foreign policy alternatives.
- Security implications and their impact on regional stability.
- Additional issues linked to the human rights problem.
- Russian alternatives in which to exploit the discrimination issue.
D. SCOPE
The focus of this thesis will be on the alleged discrimination of ethnic
Russians in the Baltic States and an examination of ancillary issues that have
an impact on Russian foreign policy in this area. This paper maintains that
the issue of ethnic discrimination and human rights violations, although
significant in its own right, is but the tip of the iceberg. The thesis will
demonstrate that Russia's interests in the Baltic region go well beyond the
defense of ethnic Russian's rights. It is likely that the rights issue represents a
political problem that facilitates the Russian foreign policy for maintaining a
presence in the Baltic States be it negotiated or imposed.
E. METHODOLOGY
In order to examine the relevant aspects related to the scope of the
thesis argument, I will use a synthesis of both qualitative empirical analysis
and normative analysis in order to describe and explain the political and
social events transpiring in the Baltic countries. Using a combination of these
two techniques, I hope to eliminate the pitfall of introducing analytical bias
and maximize an understanding of these events in terms of a comprehensive
treatment of the evidence. 7
To obtain such evidence, I have conducted a comprehensive search for
both primary source material and secondary literature that address the
principle and ancillary factors attributable to this issue. This material
includes acquisitions of scholarly works, journal reviews, magazine articles,
newspaper clippings, in-depth analytical articles contained in RFE/RL
Research Reports, and primary source material such as FBIS and RFE/RL
Daily Reports .
I have also conducted a literature review to explore the historical
corollary between the current events transpiring in the Baltics and other
examples of ethnic strife that created problems during the interwar years. The
relevance of this review is not to confirm the old maxim that history repeats
itself, or that past events in any way have a direct bearing on the ultimate
outcome of the Baltic dilemma. By approaching it from the rational actor
level of analysis, I hope such a review will provide an insight into, (1) any
correlations that illustrate the factors currently affecting the decision making
process of the actors in the Baltic region compared to the interests and
objectives that drove the decision making process in other cases where ethnic
rivalries created dissention, and (2) what we can learn from such an analysis
in terms of the similarities of the policies that result. 8
1. Importance Of Thesis
The importance of this study is crucial to an understanding of
the various elements in the human rights mosaic currently coloring the
political canvas of the Baltic Region.
Comprehending the motives and interests of the Russian
government in their treatment of this issue, may indeed be the cornerstone
in laying a broader foundation for an appreciation of the operational variables
through which the Russian government must perform.
The topic discussed in this paper is significant because East
European stability and security depend upon an awareness of a problem with
this magnitude. By assessing the meaning and consequences that result from
Russia's policies toward the Baltics, international and European organizations
can develop and adopt strategies designed to defuse rising tensions, reconcile
grievances, encourage negotiations, or counter intrusive Russian behavior.
2. Literature Review
Karl Marx once postulated that history does, in fact, repeat itself.
"The first time as tragedy, the second as farce."9 Certainly, to allow events to
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acquire the momentum necessary to repeat a tragic situation is mankinds
greatest folly.
What we are witnessing in the Baltic States resembles events
that have been repeated in various countries in East Europe and elsewhere
since states have decided to ignore the ethnic dimensions of territory and
nationalism, and have quite arbitrarily established boundaries based on the
capricious wishes, or designs, of royalty or heads of state.
An appreciation of this phenomena will hopefully provide a
better understanding for why the Baltic problem should be of interest. The
hope for regional stability, and the security of Europe, depends upon the
lessons we can assimilate from prior misadventures and how we translate
what we have learned into defining imperatives for action, or a recognition
for the costs of neglect.
To acquire such an historical appreciation, a number of works
were consulted on the topic of ethnic strife and the problems of ethnopolitics
that developed in the interwar years from tinkering with national boundaries
and the nationalistic feelings of the people that were aroused as a result.
One such area was the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. The
ethnic Germans of the Sudetenland were fiercely nationalistic and considered
themselves to be a part of greater Germany. They greatly resented having
been placed within the state of Czechoslovakia following World War I.10
Another area where a great deal of ethnic engineering took place
was the Soviet Union. During the interwar years, Stalin redefined borders
and moved massive numbers of people from traditional homelands to other
locales. The resultant ethnic tensions remained with the Soviet Union and
its successor states. Until recent times, these tensions have been swept aside
by brutal repression while the facade the USSR maintained was one of ethnic
bliss. In reality, nothing could be farther from the' truth. Once the Soviet
Union collapsed, there was nothing to hold back the anger and hatred locked
away for decades, and ethnic clashes erupted everywhere.
One such location is the Baltic region where ethnic hatreds have
grown progressively worse. Not between the Baltic States themselves, but
between the indigenous citizens of the Baltic countries and the Russian
minorities living there. 11
The historical parallels between the ethnic clashes of the past,
and the events taking place in the Baltic States today, suggest that the Baltic
States face many of the same problems that other governments, such as
Czechoslovakia, have faced.
The fact that the Baltic States face many of the same domestic
issues the Czech government did, warrants a cautious approach to the
manner in which they handle the current ethnic tensions.
Even more importantly, history has taught us to look beneath
the surface and not accept things at face value. Although the Russian
10
government is concerned over the situation faced by ethnic Russians living
in the Baltic countries, the issue may represent opportunities for the
advancement of national interests that certain elements cannot overlook. As
the paper will demonstrate, concern over ethnic discrimination and human
rights may play into the hands of those who would use it as a pretext for the
pursuit of these Russian interests.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is divided into five chapters as follows:
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION
Chapter II: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS PERCEIVED IN
THE BALTIC STATES (1992)
This chapter examines the issue of human rights violations and ethnic
discrimination from the Baltic States Point of view. The problems associated
with voting and citizenship laws will be discussed along with additional
grievances of ethnic Russians. The chapter will also investigate the
perspective of the Baltic citizen and the attitudes they have exhibited toward
the Russian speaking population. Finally, attention will focus on the role
outside European organizations have played in assessing the validity of the
charges against the Baltic countries regarding rights violations.
Chapter III: RUSSIAN POSITION
This chapter examines the Russian response to charges made by ethnic
Russians living in the Baltic States regarding alleged human rights violations
11
and the various policy options available to the Russian government to
modify the Baltic States position and response to the charges. Additionally,
the paper will inquire into Russia's utilization of various European and
international organizations to elicit support for their position, and a
discussion of the security implications for regional stability will follow.
Chapter IV: ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL RUSSIAN MOTIVES
This chapter looks at Russia's foreign policy from several different
perspectives. A description of immediate concerns probes the Russian
Foreign Ministry's concern for problems associated with the withdrawal of
Russian forces from the Baltic region and also the strategic implications such
a withdrawal could have on Russian interests in the area. Then, an
exploration of Russian interests and policies will help develop the thesis
argument that the issue of rights violations is a political problem that is
driving Russian foreign policy to support a military presence in the Baltic
region.
Chapter V: CONCLUSION
This chapter will present conclusions base upon the findings and
analysis drawn from the research.
G. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The difficulties faced by ethnic Russians living on the perimeter of
Russia has raised the level of concern in various circles of the Russian
12
government to a point where, today, it is an issue of enormous political importance.
Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kosyrev, have been
under intense pressure by both conservative and liberal elements of the
government to find a solution to this most thorny of issues. The problem is
certainly in the public eye and criticism is flowing in from all corners
complaining not just about the nature in which the government ministries
are responding to the charges of rights violations, but questioning the
fundamental principles of democracy and reform that constitute the bedrock
of the Yeltsin administration.
This underlying lack of confidence concerning the issue of ethnic
Russians in the Baltics is symptomatic of even greater problems the Yeltsin
government faces in its quest for a democratic, market oriented society.
Because of this criticism, the Yeltsin government is taking an
increasingly conservative stand on human rights violations with the Baltic
States, and it has attempted to link the issue with continued withdrawal of
Russian troops from the Baltics, threatened economic sanctions, attempted to
coerce the Baltic States into building housing for returning Russian troops,
and has even threatened to intervene militarily if the Baltics do not "shape
up."
Interestingly, this last alternative, a destabilizing alternative for
regional stability and of obvious alarm and concern for European
organizations responsible for European security, may be exactly what
13
conservative elements in the government and military wish to see.
Intervention represents one avenue in the Russian arsenal of options to
maintain a presence in the Baltics. It is entirely likely that in the months to
come, the issue of human rights violations will facilitate a Russians foreign
policy of retaining a presence in the Baltic States. The question is, with the
Baltic countries calling for the Russian withdrawal, will the Russians ignore
their wishes and remain anyway?
14
II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE BALTIC STATES (1992)
A. BACKGROUND
The Baltic States have had difficulty with the current issue of alleged
human rights violations of ethnic Russians because they view the matter
from an entirely different perspective than the Russian government. The
Baltic position has been one of state sovereignty and the right to determine
how best to govern the peoples residing within their respective boundaries.
They resent, and have resisted, attempts by the Russian military and foreign
ministry to bully them into revising their approach to this problem and
question the motives behind what they consider Russian meddling in their
internal affairs.
Conversely, there are factions within the Russian government that
have taken up the cause of alleged human rights violations in the Baltics.
They have escalated the debate on the problem to the point where constant
attention has been focused on this dilemma since the middle of 1992.
There has been little respite from the controversy with both sides
appealing to European and international bodies for assistance. These
organizations have not failed to take note of the developing crisis.
In this regard, it is necessary and important to examine the Baltic
position on the factors pertaining to this issue, including a discussion of the
15
Baltic States. To reflect this rationale, this chapter is organized in the
following way:
- Ethnic Russians.
- Baltic Reaction to discrimination charges.
- European and international organizations.
B. ETHNIC RUSSIANS
Currently, the status of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the
Baltics, depending upon the side to which you speak, is debateable. The
Russians, especially in the states of Estonia and Latvia, have been decrying
that social injustices are occurring routinely, and it has angered and
frightened large segments of this population. It would be instructive to
explore these grievances and consider the relevance of this ethnic Russian
population by discussing: (1) their demographic significance, (2) the current
citizenship and voting requirements, and (3) the exact nature of the human
rights violations, that they contend, exist.
1. Demographic Significance
The human rights issue has its roots firmly grounded in the
abuses of Russification foisted upon the Baltic States by Joseph Stalin.
Massive numbers of the indigenous population were systematically deported
and executed while others fled for their lives. Before 1940, ethnic Estonians
constituted nearly 90% of the population.^ Since that time ethnic Russians
and other Russian speakers have grown to represent nearly 40% of the total
16
population. In Latvia, during the same time frame, ethnic Latvians
accounted initially for roughly 88% of the population, but ethnic Russians
and other Russian speakers now account for nearly 50%. Although Lithuania
retained a large portion of its ethnic base, Russian speakers who arrived later
have come to dominate large areas of the country. 1
3
Whether one would describe this process as ethnic cleansing on
a grand scale, or "slow cultural genocide", the occupation of the Baltics, and
the resultant suppression of local languages and permanent presence of
Soviet troops, all contributed to the immediate goal of creating a Russian
majority and a long term aim of the total destruction of the Baltic State's
cultures and languages. 14
What one finds today is a significant ethnic Russian population.
Statistics based on 1990 ethnic composition show that Estonians represent
roughly 65% of the population while ethnic Russians account for 28% with
Russian speakers of other ethnic groups making up the difference. Ethnic
Latvians number 54% of the total population and Russians follow close
behind with 33%. Other Russian speakers and ethnic groups make up the
rest. Lithuania is the only Baltic State that finds its indigenous ethnic
population retains a clear majority. Ethnic Lithuanians amount to 80% of the
total population with ethnic Russians numbering only 8.6%. Poles and
Byelorussians make up the rest. 15
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The Baltic States must contend with a large ethnic Russian
population. Denying citizenship to Baltic Russians will not make them
disappear, and non-citizens could and have made their existence an awkward
problem by turning to Moscow for help. Today, they are faced with
numerous hardships. In all three countries naturalization is being made as
difficult as possible, even for the many Russians who voted for Baltic
independence. 16
2. Citizenship And Voting
Other than the discrimination that is allegedly taking place in
some corners of Baltic society, the biggest single injustice that Ethnic Russians
and the Russian government have complained about is the manner in which
the citizenship and voting requirements have violated their human rights.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States rushed to
reassert their cultural dominance by writing citizenship laws that require a
residency requirement (ten years in Lithuania, 16 in Latvia, and three in
Estonia) and a language test which, it is anticipated, most Russia speakers will
have a hard time passing. Supposedly, non-citizens, that are the result of
these laws, will not be evicted, but neither can they vote, serve in
government, or as in Estonia and Latvia, claim minority rights. Additionally,
Estonia held an election in the fall of 1992 in which over a third of the
inhabitants could not vote because they did not qualify as citizens. Latvia
prevents non-citizens from owning property. 17
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These citizenship laws have drawn attention from many
different quarters and are viewed as an issue that is highly problematic 18 If
ways can be found to resolve these questions of citizenship without violating
human rights of not only ethnic Russians, but other non-citizens as well, the
Baltics States entry into Europe will be faster and easier than that of the other
new countries. 19
Theoretically, the question of human rights and citizenship was
discussed by Imants Liegis, a prominent Baltic citizen, where he postulated
these are two distinct issues in which decisions about citizenship should not
be confused with questions of human rights. Human rights in the European
context, governed by the European Convention on Human Rights and its
protocols, embraces human rights issues as: the right to life; prohibitions
against torture or inhuman punishment; the right to a fair hearing; freedom
of thought and religion and so on. The rights "shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,... language,... national or
social origin," etc. But, he continues, what about Russia's charges of
"discrimination"? The question of becoming a citizen of a country is not a
right covered by the European convention. To receive citizenship is a
privilege, not a right. Certain rights emanate from this privilege and along
with these, responsibilities. Is it therefore "discrimination" to exclude from
automatic citizenship those who migrated, in the case of Latvia, as a result of
19
the Soviet Union's colonialist policies during illegal occupation? Liegis
believed not. 20
Given this justification for citizenship requirements, it is
important to note that his opinion is representative of only one side of the
issue. When discussing citizenship, former Latvian Foreign Minister Javis
Jurkans noted that serious foreign policy problems in the East and West could
result if the citizenship problem is not resolved in favor of the majority of
residents. Jurkans believes that progress can be made only if normal relations
are established between native and ethnic populations. 21
The Estonian Foreign Affairs Minister, Trivimi Velliste,
emphasized part of the citizenship debate wrestled with the vagueness of
concepts such as human rights and political rights. He believes they are
different things. Velliste stated that human rights were being fully observed
in Estonia and political rights were addressed in, what he considers, a truly
democratic constitution. 22
Even with these conciliatory responses to the citizenship issue,
all three Baltic States remain resolute on the point concerning non-citizens
satisfying the language requirement. Estonia's Prime Minister Mart Laar
reflected the Baltic resolve on this issue when he said no arbitrariness is
permissible. Those who are required to take an examination should be
informed about these requirements. 23 Fortunately, Laar also promised to
guarantee non-citizens equal rights and said the Estonian government was
20
prepared to automatically grant citizenship without any language
requirement for Russians who had applied for it by 1990. "According to law,
non-Estonians may now vote in next year's local elections. Estonia is the first
nation in Europe to try this," Laar said. 24
Despite all the tough talk regarding satisfaction of all citizenship
requirements before ethnic Russians or other minorities can officially become
citizens, the rhetoric is tempered a bit by what Estonian President Meri
describes as a question of honor. He stressed that people in Estonia,
irrespective of nationality, language, and creed are guaranteed the recognized
human rights. 25
3. Discrimination/Human Rights Violations
The clamor over human rights violations of ethnic Russians has
created stormy seas on both the Russian and Baltic diplomatic and political
fronts. Diplomats and legislators from both sides have sought to understand
the dynamics of the problem and resolve all outstanding grievances and
issues associated with it. The intensity of emotion with which the
predicament of ethnic Russians can be viewed ultimately resulted in Yeltsin
suspending the withdrawal of all troops from the Baltics pending satisfaction
of human rights guarantees.
Ethnic Russians are angered and frightened by what many of
them consider the dire turn of events regarding the Soviet Union's collapse
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and look to the future with a sense of foreboding. Russians, once servants of
the empire, are now a minority, and complaining about it bitterly. 26
Specifically, their fears and concerns revolve around the issues
of citizenship. Many are fearful that their jobs and promotions depend upon
mastering the state language. To many, the expense of mastering the new
language may be prohibitive. Others, such as retired military officers, are
concerned that they will be evicted from their apartments which, in many
cases, were owned by the Soviet army, but have now transferred ownership to
the various Baltic States. In Estonia, ethnic Russians cannot own land for the
foreseeable future, and they are prohibited from voting in national elections
until they satisfy the stringent citizenship requirements.27
Many ethnic Russians are adamant about the role they have
played in shaping the Baltic States. Vladamir Chuikin, a non-Estonian who is
chairman of the Narva City Council said, "The intent of these laws is clear:
to frighten the Russian-speaking population and push it out of Estonia. Why
should I answer for Stalin and the Soviet Union and whatever happened
here? Many Estonians served the regime, and don't they bear any
responsibility? We helped create wealth here, so shouldn't we share in it?"28
Russian diplomat Boris Tsepov, involved in talks over
discrimination issues in the Baltics, reflected the anger and uncertainty of the
Russian residents living in Baltic countries when he said, "It is almost ethnic
cleansing, what they are doing." He said ethnic Russians were being hounded
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out of jobs and housing. "Patriotism has crossed over into militant
nationalism. "29
Ethnic Russians, accustomed for so many years to feeling at
home everywhere, now believe they have been wronged. It is characteristic
for Russians to identify themselves with their country as do other peoples in
countries throughout the world. Now, in the Baltics, they see the loss of
power and influence they once had in the region, as well as the shrinking
military presense, and they perceive this as detrimental to Russia. Therefore,
they feel it is harmful to them as well. 30 Another Russian, describing the
issue as a psychological problem said, "We were used to being elder brothers,
and now we have to get used to being a national minority." 31
C BALTIC REACTION TO DISCRIMINATION CHARGES
Contrary to the Russian side, the Baltic States have reacted quite
differently to charges of human rights violations. They have defended their
state sovereignty and have, at times, been quite astonished by the volume of
accusations and the escalation of the debate. To better understand the Baltic
position this section will investigate, (1) the validity of the charges and
grievances, (2) the perspective of the Baltic citizen, and (3) the Baltic concern
over the Russian response.
1. Validity Of Charges/Grievances
The Baltic States do not deny that, to a certain degree,
discrimination is occurring, but government leaders have tried to reassure
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the Russian government that they are doing their utmost to protect the
human rights of ethnic Russians and encouraging their assimilation into
Baltic life and culture.
Lithuania is a good example of these policies. The problem of
ethnic diversity is much less intense in Lithuania because its non-Lithuanian
population is much smaller.^ 2 Even so, Lithuania's citizenship law allowed
virtually all residents to receive citizenship if they applied by November 3,
1991.
Estonian President Meri, on a state visit to Finland, was asked
about punishing non-Estonians currently living in Estonia for events from
the past. Meri said the issue was not one of punishment and that the Soviets
were ruthless to Russians and Estonians alike. He felt it would be a big
mistake to view Russian families as enemies, and they were victims just like
Estonians. 33
As if these conciliatory remarks were not enough, in a meeting
between Russian and Latvian parliamentarians, the Russian delegates agreed
that the recent complaints about discrimination of the military officers,
allegedly taking place in Latvia, had no leg to stand on. 34
The Baltic States believe their naturalization process, including a
language requirement, is a reasonably liberal response. The Estonian's
residency requirement of three years is unusually liberal when compared to a
five year period in the United States.35
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The validity of charges on human rights violations can be
further contested because little evidence exists of such abuses, and some of the
new laws covering citizenship are as yet incomplete. Although the potential
for abuse is certainly there, Estonian and Latvian officials say no abuse is
intended and none will be allowed. 36
2. Perspective Of The Baltic Citizen
As enlightened as the governments of the Baltic States might be,
failing to mention the feelings of the common Baltic citizen toward their non-
citizen neighbors would be neglecting a large part of the discrimination issue.
Diplomats from Latvia and Estonia concede that decades of
Soviet domination have left bitter emotions toward Russians, particularly
former military officers. 37
Estonians and Latvians consider most of the Russians as
occupiers that were brought in large numbers to the illegally annexed
countries to Russify there language and destroy their culture. Russian
became the operating language. Many leading citizens were deported, or
executed, and thousands of others were deported or escaped. 38
Mart Rannut, the head of Estonia's National language Board,
expressed his contempt when he said "after what the Soviets did to us, for us
to ask Russians to learn a little language as the cost of citizenship seems not
too big a price to ask." "We're not jailing them, deporting them, or depriving
them of housing. "39
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President Meri put it most eloquently when he spoke of the
psychological damage done to all subjects of the former Soviet empire and of
how, as in "Sleeping Beauty," suppressed countries have awakened years later
with all their pre-war passions and attitudes intact. In Estonia, he said, the
result is a legal and emotional effort to revive the country frozen in 1940.
"But there is no hatred." "There is only the fear of being extinguished on
your own soil. "40
3. Concern Over Russian Response
As the debate between Russia and the Baltics has progressed, the
Baltic leadership has become very concerned over the foreign policy
initiatives Moscow might take to address the allegations of human rights
abuses. Baltic leaders are painfully aware that the whole course of events
largely depends on Russia's domestic and foreign policy, its understanding of
its interests, and the ability to defend them. In particular the role and
behavior of the Russian diaspora in the near and remote foreign countries are
directly influenced by the progress or curtailment of reforms in Russia and by
the successes or failure of the negotiating process. 41
Nowhere is this concern more apparent than with the status of
troop withdrawal from Baltic soil. Diplomats from both sides have met
repeatedly, but only Lithuania has met with any success in reaching an accord
with the Russians on a definitive plan for the departure of Russian troops by
the end of 1993.42 Latvia and Estonia, to date, have been unable to agree in
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principle on a time table regarding troop withdrawal and have steadfastly
refused to make significant concessions regarding citizenship laws.
The issue of human rights and the alleged abuse perpetrated
against ethnic Russians, and Russian troops, prompted President Yeltsin, on
29 October 1992, to suspend withdrawal altogether. The linkage of troop
withdrawal to the problem of alleged human rights abuses, an issue that the
Baltic countries believe has been exaggerated beyond reason, is, they feel, not
within the purview of Russian foreign policy. It has infuriated and worried
Baltic leadership. They view the continuing presence of Russian troops on
their territories as the greatest single threat to their security and
independence. 43
Russian proposals, offering withdrawal of troops by 1994 on the
condition that the three Baltic States guarantee the rights of resident Russians
and soldiers while abandoning any territorial claims on Russia, have been
rejected. The Baltic leaders argue that Russia is raising the human rights
issues only to sustain its hegemony over the region and delay the withdrawal
of its forces.44
The fear over a resurgent Russian military and Russian
domination is considerable. Although unspoken, the idea that
independence, wrested from the Soviet collapse, may be no longer than the 20
years of sovereignty wrested from the chaos of the first World War does not
seem unthinkable. 45
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If the pace of withdrawals by occupation forces, and Russia's
intentions for their deployment, are not enough for concern, the Baltic States
are also worried about Russia's policies toward the Baltic economies.
There are those in leadership positions that consider the
economic vulnerability of the Baltics just as significant an issue. They depend
almost entirely on the Russian market and Russian supplies. If Russia were
to demand high prices for goods, the fragile Baltic economies would collapse.
The fundamentalist Lithuanian government sees economic issues as an
attempt to possibly draw the former republics back into some form of
confederation. 46
Juri Kahn, the Estonian Ambassador to Russia, tried to view
things in a more positive light by saying there was not a need for serious fears
that economic sanctions, imposed because of the alleged human rights
violations, would be terribly difficult as long as Western governments
supported their policies. 47
Finally, there is the question of Russia's economy. By virtue of
the Baltics being in the Ruble Zone (save Estonia's Kroon), Russia is the key
to Baltic economic stabilization. To a large extent, the near-term prospects of
the Baltic States depend on the success of economic stabilization in Russia.48
There is cause for concern over the events taking place in the
Baltic States. Social, economic, and military worries have placed enormous
burdens upon the Yeltsin government. The pressure these concerns are
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generating is helping to shape Russian foreign policy, including its policies
toward the Baltic States. The Baltic leadership, in turn, are most certainly
watching the developing events in Russia and contemplating their own
interests within the broader context of Russian interests.
D. EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A discussion of the events taking place in the Baltic countries, with
respect to the human rights issues, would not be complete without including
the role that individual organizations are playing in resolving this sensitive
issue. The paper will briefly explore: (1) Baltic requests for independent
review, and (2) the response to these Baltic overtures.
1. Baltic Request For Independent Review
As the topic of human rights violations has grown, Baltic leaders
have increasingly sought the council, advice, and endorsement of various
European and International bodies. They have done so hoping to deflect the
mounting criticism from some corners (especially the Russian corner) as well
as to seek security arrangements that may possibly become necessary should
relations begin to decay with the Russians and events turn increasingly
hostile. If, in the process of seeking such security arrangements, a clear
message is sent to the Russian government regarding European resolve for
stability and security in the area, the Baltic leadership will have achieved
their objective.
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Baltic attempts to resolve both human rights issues and Russian
troop withdrawal have quite naturally led them to the United Nations. The
three Baltic countries petitioned the 92nd U. N. General Assembly in the
form of a draft resolution, for their help in persuading Russia to immediately
remove its troops. Although this resolution was eventually adopted, such a
resolution from the U. N. could not be enforced. Even so, the Baltic
representatives hoped to attract enough attention to pressure Russia into an
agreement. 49
The issue has also been addressed at a conference of the newly
established Baltic Sea Council where the Lithuanian Foreign Minister
suggested that Vilnius be the home of a minority rights office. 50
NATO has also been a target for the Baltic lobbyists. In an
address while visiting Brussels, V. Landsbergis, Chairman of the Lithuanian
Supreme Council frequently referred to the threats and pressure to which
Lithuania was being subjected and called for NATO, or the WEU, to
participate in supervising troop withdrawal. He did not rule out the
possibility of military intervention involving Russian troops in the Baltics.51
In other discussions with NATO officials, Andrejs Krastinsh, the
Latvian Supreme Council's deputy chairman expressed the wish of the
Latvian government that European observers would come to Latvia and give
their report on the actual military-political situation in Latvia. 52
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2. Response To Baltic Overtures
The concerted effort of Baltic diplomats did indeed focus world
attention on the activities transpiring in their countries and elicited responses
from a number of different organizations expressing concern for European
security and regional stability.
On a visit to Estonia, Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt
expressed confidence that Estonia would be able to resolve the Russian
question. 53
A meeting discussing stability in the Baltic region, organized by
the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), resulted in recommendations that the
Baltic States stress the need to use external security structures. The NAA
expressed the sentiment that it regards the Baltic States as "a zone of danger
which is an international problem."54
Secretary General of the European Council , Catherine
Talumiere, held a press conference in which she found valid points on both
sides of the human rights issue, but also stressed that Russia should withdraw
its troops from these countries without delay. She urged that Russian
problems linked with troop withdrawal not be considered, and recommended
that the evolving conditions not be dramatized by escalatory language or
actions.. 55
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
has also expressed its concern and support for events developing in the Baltic
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region. The leaders of the Baltic States considered the CSCE support so
valuable that the draft resolution submitted to the U. N. to ensure the
peaceful withdrawal of Russian forces noted the support and the efforts of
participants to the CSCE. 5f>
Acting on the draft resolution, the U.N. passed the request on 25
November 1992. It called for the quick withdrawal of the roughly 70-80,000
troops left in the Baltics, and it also required Russia to negotiate agreements
between Latvia and Estonia in establishing time-tables on the withdrawal.
Lithuania had previously negotiated such an agreement.57
In its turn, NATO has also responded to the Baltic situation.
During a visit of Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Landsbergis, NATO
Secretary General Woerner hastened to say the NATO countries are
interested not only in Lithuanian security, but also in protecting it from
outside pressure and interference. 58
During a show of support by eight visiting NATO ships to
Latvia, Latvian Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Andrejs Krastins,
expressed the hope that the NATO Naval Forces would promote the
withdrawal of Russian forces. The Commander of the NATO Navy, Mr.
Hildesley, added that he considered the presence of Russian warships in
Latvia as a source of instability, and that the government of Great Britain, in
concert with the governments of the other NATO states, agrees with Latvian
demands and finds them justified. 5 ^
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In what has probably been the definitive NATO statement to
date, Chairman of the NATC ) Military Committee General Vigleik Eide, on a
visit to Estonia, considered immediate Russian troop withdrawal the basis for
normal relations with Russia. He also maintained that Estonia should
ensure the rights of Russian troops currently stationed there, to ease the
tension, and that finding economic and political agreement was easier than
fighting the Russian Army. The general commented on the problems ethnic
minorities have caused in contemporary Europe, but thought Estonia's
sovereignty must be respected and protected.60 European security and stability
depend upon the Baltic States and Russia arriving at a mutually satisfactory




From the Russian perspective, the problem of minority rights in the
Baltics is an interesting combination of factors that have resulted in the
Yeltsin government taking a conservative stand on this contentious, divisive
issue and fanning the flames of discontent on both sides.
Although not immediately apparent, after the August 1991 coup,
minority rights have increasingly become a more important priority of both
conservatives and liberals in the Russian government. Conservatives have
charged that Yeltsin's handling of foreign affairs has repeatedly downplayed
the importance of relations with other former Soviet republics, as well as the
plight of Russian minorities, and that Yeltsin has devoted an inordinate
amount of resources and time to courting the West for economic favors and
concessions.61
The situation in the Baltics is complicated by the Baltic States'
insistence upon immediate withdrawal of all Russian forces stationed on
Baltic soil. At first glance, the questions of troop withdrawal, on the one
hand, and of discrimination against minorities, on the other, appear
completely dissimilar. However, this chapter will show how the Russian
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response regarding discrimination against Russian speakers is linked to not
only the question of troop withdrawal, but other issues as well that, in
total,comprise the various factors that must be considered in contemplating
the policy options at the Russian government's disposal.
This chapter will examine the following areas:
- The Governments Response To Alleged Discrimination.
- Current Policy Considerations.
- Security Implications/ Regional Stability.
B. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION
In order to understand why Russia is considering certain policy options
it would be instructive to first study how the political factions in Russia view
the matter of human rights violations and discrimination of ethnic Russians
in the Baltics and with what concern. Therefore, the following topics will be
covered: (1) how and why the issue is gaining momentum, (2) Russia's views
on protecting ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries, (3) the linkage question,
and (4) the divisive nature of the problem in the Russian government.
1. Issue Gaining Momentum
The current debate over minority rights and discrimination
against Russian speakers in the Baltics started to gain momentum around the
middle of 1992, and it has continued unabated since that time.
The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, believes that the
priority of Russian foreign policy is to develop good relations with Russia's
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new neighbors, the former republics of the Soviet empire. Bad relations with
the former republics could hurt Russia by making it less attractive to both
foreign aid and investment. Without good relations with the former Soviet
republics, there is the risk that disputes could lead to a sharp increase in
tension and instability.62
Although interested in good relations with the republics,
Kozyrev is primarily concerned about Russia remaining an attractive
recipient of foreign aid. Kozyrev's heavy emphasis on the correlation
between successful foreign policy and fiscal health implied that Russia will
concentrate its diplomatic efforts on countries that can help it solve its own
domestic problems.63
Hence, much attention was paid to courting the West for such
economic favors while neglecting to notice the problems developing with
their Baltic neighbors. By the time the foreign ministry started taking notice
of the complaints about rights violations, predominately conservative
elements within the executive and legislative branches of the government,
and the military, had seized upon the issue and were exploiting it for political
gain.
Even though the issue of minority rights had started to surface
as early as March of 1992, the main issue of linkage to Russian troop
withdrawal was yet to come The Baltic States have been pressing, and
continue to press, the Russian government for complete troop withdrawal by
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repeatedly demanding schedules. It seems more than coincidental that as the
demands for troop withdrawal have become more strident, the accusations of
discrimination against ethnic Russian minorities, including acting and
retired Russian military, have become more frequent. One possible reason
for the recent accusations about human rights violations has been random
acts of violence perpetrated primarily by anonymous individuals against
Russian military personnel and installations. Additionally, ethnic Russians
living in the various Baltic States have complained that the citizenship and
voting requirements of the three governments are discriminatory.
2. Protecting Ethnic Russians
In late Februarv 1992, Kozyrev told "Novosti" that Russia
respected the sovereignty of CIS states, but would strictly defend its own
interests, including protection of Russians and Russian-speakers, in other CIS
states. Some feel that Kozyrev's statement indicates that Russia considers
itself to have a considerable mandate in the CIS, and that it believes it
possesses the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.64
Kozyrev, speaking at a conference of the Baltic Sea Council,
criticized the Baltic States for failing to respect the human rights of Russian
speakers. He suggested that the council appoint a trouble shooter on minority
rights. 65
As the situation has developed, the perception of the Russian
government about Baltic discriminatory practices was reflected in the
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inflammatory rhetoric of both Kozyrev and State Counselor for political
affairs Sergei B. Stankevich. Kozyrev was quoted as saying that Russia "will
be protecting the rights of Russians in other states of the commonwealth; this
gets top priority. We shall protect their rights firmly and we will be using
forceful methods if needed." Stankevich expressed great concern about the
fate of ethnic Russians in the republics, stressing that Russia's interest in
these people did not constitute interference in another state's internal
affairs. 66
Russia has also indicated its anger at the Baltics, for civil rights
violations, by protesting the various voting and citizenship laws. During the
month of April 1992, Russia protested against the Estonian citizenship laws
and criticized the Latvian language law, expressing dissatisfaction that the
Russian language now had the same status as any other foreign language in
Latvia.67
Withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics has been an "on
and off again" operation that has sorely tested the patience of the Baltic
governments, but the Yeltsin government has become increasingly critical of
the Baltic States and their treatment of Russian servicemen. The Russian
Foreign Ministry joined with the Defense Ministry in protesting against the
treatment of Russian troops serving in the Baltic States. The statement read
in part that "Russia does not intend to stand idly by in the face of insulting
treatment of Russian troops and will defend their interests in the most
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decisive manner." It added that provocative statements were hindering the
progress of troop withdrawal talks. This statement was interesting for two
reasons. First, it suggested that the two ministries are coordinating policy on
the Baltic issues. Secondly, it was the first real hint of linkage between the
minorities question and troop withdrawal. 68
In a similar vein, Stankevich criticized Russian foreign policy
for its failure to stand up for the rights of the Russian population in other
countries. He accused four states, of which two were Estonia and Latvia, of
oppressing their Russian minorities and threatened to use force to protect
them. Stankevich noted that Russia would soon reemerge as a power capable
of protecting its people.69
By September 1992 the situation was deteriorating quickly.
Russia's delegation to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly warned
Estonia and Latvia, on 29 September 1992, against pursuing a policy of "ethnic
cleansing." Sergei Yastrzhembsky said his government was concerned about
policies toward non-Baits in Estonia and Latvia that could lead these two
states "to slide down the slope to the practice of ethnic cleansing."™
3. Linkage Question
In August 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev linked troop
withdrawal in the Baltics to the issue of discrimination of ethnic Russians. In
all, troop withdrawal was linked to nine specific points. Two of them
pertained directly to the minorities issue. Point seven stated that the Baltics
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must guarantee social benefits and human rights for retired Soviet Officers
and their families residing in the Baltic States. Point eight required the Baltic
States to alter laws that infringed upon the political and economic rights of
the Russian speaking populations. 7 *
President Yeltsin stated that no troop withdrawal agreements
would be signed with Estonia and Latvia until they guaranteed more
extensive "minority rights" for Russians. Yeltsin accused both states of gross
violations of the rights of their Russian minorities and urged both states to
adopt minority legislation similar to that of Lithuania. 72
Finally, on 29 October 1992, Yeltsin issued a directive to suspend
withdrawal of Russian troops because of alleged human rights violations
suffered by Russians in the Baltics. This new Russian position appeared to be
the first manifestation of the tougher foreign policy Yeltsin had called for in a
speech to the Foreign Ministry on 27 October 1992. 73 The issue of linking
troop withdrawals from the Baltic States to alleged violations of the minority
rights of ethnic Russians was now a reality and not merely a threat.
4. Divisive Concern
Clearly, the evidence of a frustrated and embattled Yeltsin
government had revealed itself as the months passed by, and the crisis grew
proportionately. Conservative factions in the government had been very
critical of the government's failure to improve bilateral relations with the
former republics and specifically its resolve in addressing the rights of
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Russian minorities. An examination of their position might help in
understanding Russia's current policy dilemma concerning its Baltic
neighbors.
As the debate developed before and during the Sixth Congress of
People's Deputies, the question of Russia's policy toward CIS states had
become a very visible part of a larger and more emotional debate over
whether the collapse of the Soviet Union was necessary, avoidable, or indeed,
reversible. Perhaps the most emotional and dangerous aspect of this debate is
the question of protecting the rights of Russians outside the Russian
Federation. 74
The issue of defending the rights of Russians living outside the
Russian state has become particularly dangerous because both conservatives
and reformers alike find themselves on the same side of the fence. Few
would argue against the protection of ethnic Russians and a guarantee for
their individual rights. The matter has become a measure of "patriotism" for
politicians eager to demonstrate their willingness to defend fellow
countrymen, by force if necessary. But the declarations to provide such
guarantees sound like incitements to interfere in the internal affairs of other
states. 75
The conservative position is exemplified by Russian Vice
President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who told a rally that the republic "existed,
exists, and must exist. " 7(i Other conservative elements have continued to
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press the Yeltsin government to act decisively on the issue of discrimination
and minority rights.
The Supreme Soviet, acting on a proposal by chairman Ruslan
Khasbulatov, started to discuss the situation in the three Baltic States paying
special attention to the real and potential discrimination against Russians and
other Slavs in the laws of the Baltic States. Vladimir Podoprigora, the
chairman of the Commission on Questions of Interrepublican Affairs,
claimed that the atmosphere was "conducive to intolerance and aggressive
nationalism." The parliament, in a similar debate passed a resolution
threatening action against Estonia in response to alleged "human rights
violations." In addition, the Supreme Soviet also adopted a statement on
"Human Rights in the Baltic States" saying it "resolutely repudiated the
inclusion in the legislative acts of the Baltic States of articles that make
discrimination on grounds of nationality the norm and that lead to an
increase in social and political tension and have a negative influence on
regional stability. " 7?
As the debate about Russia's handling of affairs with former
republics and the minority question intensified, Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev, and his moderate policies, came under increasingly harsh criticism
from conservative quarters, especially by State Counselor Stankevich.
Kozyrev has maintained that the best way to protect the rights of ethnic
Russians is to establish good relations with their host states and not by
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pressure or force. He describes those who adhere to such thinking as
belonging to the "party of war" and rejects opponents' arguments that Russia
can develop democracy at home while practicing "strong arm" tactics with its
neighbors. 78
On the other hand, Stankevich endorsed a plan announced by
Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Speaker of the Russian Parliament, to create a
separate ministry to handle Russia's affairs with the CIS. Stankevich
reportedly believes that he is the most likely candidate to head the new
ministry and has advocated transferring control over CIS affairs from the
Foreign Ministry to the new organ. Kozyrev, of course, opposes the idea,
saying that the Foreign Ministry is in the process of establishing its own
branch concerned with CIS affairs. Apart from the apparent political power
struggle between these two figures, Stankevich is truly more conservative
than Kozyrev, and he has chastised Kozyrev for handling the crisis in a weak
manner. Should Stankevich and other conservative elements gain control of
Foreign Affairs, it is quite likely that the West might see increasingly active
defense of ethnic Russians and less cooperation with Western countries.79
With both conservatives and moderates maneuvering to gain
political advantage, and the question of minority rights as one centerpiece
issue, consideration must be given to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his
position on this very sensitive problem.
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Even though Boris Yeltsin issued a proclamation on the 29th of
October 1992 suspending all troop withdrawal from the Baltics and linking
withdrawal with the question of minority rights, Yeltsin's public
pronouncement may not necessarily reflect his private position, but rather
one of political necessity. Yeltsin's overarching concern is the transformation
of a totalitarian state with a command economy into an enlightened,
pluralistic, democratic, capitalist oriented society. The job is enormous, and
there is little doubt that Yeltsin must make certain concessions to assure both
the country's survival as well as his own political survival.
Yeltsin's decision to suspend withdrawal of Russian troops from
the Baltic States may, on the surface, reflect a tougher stand toward the Baltics
by the Russian government, but it is entirely possible that he is attempting to
mollify Russian nationalists who have charged his government with
neglecting the fate of ethnic Russians and minorities on the former empire's
periphery. Although the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS said that the
main reason for Yeltsin's decision to order the suspension was discrimination
against Russian speakers, it appears as though Yeltsin is trying to balance the
demands of vocal nationalists by adopting some of their rhetoric while
protecting the people and policies he needs to keep domestic reform moving
ahead.80
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Yeltsin has resisted calls for the ouster of Andrei Kozyrev as
Foreign Minister, and for all his tough talk on the Baltics he is allowing the
withdrawal of troops to quietly continue.
Indeed, several diplomatic overtures seem to point in this
direction. After the 29 October 1992 announcement suspending troop
withdrawal, Andrei Kozyrev performed some backpedaling, saying that the
withdrawal should continue, but that the suspension was merely a strategy
meant to streamline the pull-out. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister,
Vitaly Churkin, said that Russia merely wanted to discuss discrimination
against ethnic Russians, and that there was no reason for anyone to get overly
excited. 81 Additionally, Churkin advised Estonia to disregard the order by
Yeltsin and made three points: first, Yeltsin's decree did not change the
process of troop withdrawal; second, the decree was part of an internal
working document not intended for public dissemination; and third, Russia
would not link troop withdrawals to alleged "human rights issues."82
President Yeltsin attempted to alleviate the problem in a press
conference on 5 November 1992 when he said that the decision to suspend
troop withdrawals from the Baltics had been made because the Defense
Ministry had overstrained the process by stationing some units in open fields.
Yeltsin said that Lithuania's schedule for withdrawals would be followed, and
a commission had been formed to discuss schedules with Latvia and Estonia.
Rights of Russian-speaking minorities would not be linked to the process.83
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It appears that each move in this game of chess, regarding
human rights in the Baltic region, is being made very cautiously. The
political realities are such that President Yeltsin is in no position to ignore
demands for action from his conservative opponents. The stakes appear to be
not only the fate of ethnic Russians, or the pace of troop withdrawals from
the Baltics, but the political survival of President Yeltsin and his ministers
and the survival of the democratic and economic reforms the Yeltsin
government is trying to accomplish.
C CURRENT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
With the human rights question in the Baltics consuming more and
more time, diplomatic energy has shifted to not only negotiating a settlement,
but exploring other options the Russian government has at its disposal to
convince the Baltic States that what Russia considers in its best interests
would also be in the best interests of the Baltic region. This section will
consider these options which include: (1) linkage with troop withdrawal and
intervention, (2) sanctions that could be applied, and (3) using European and
international organizations to help settle the dispute.
1. Linkage With Troop Withdrawal
As demonstrated in the previous section, the Russian
government, for various reasons, considers the minorities issue in the Baltics
to be a highly charged one, fraught with political and diplomatic dilemmas.
The Yeltsin government has not been completely successful in dealing with
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the crisis and, on occasion, there have been conflicting signals regarding
Russia's policy with respect to this issue and the various options it believes it
has at its disposal.
Whatever option the Yeltsin government elects to pursue, the
desired result is the elimination of discriminatory behavior on the part of the
Baltic States toward Russian minorities. For the Yeltsin government, this
would primarily take the form of legislative initiatives and executive decrees
that would modify, or eliminate, current voting and citizenship laws which
are targets of Russian criticism. Conservative elements within the executive
and legislative branches of the government, and the military, favor adoption
of harsher policies designed to maintain Russian hegemony in the Baltic
region. Other issues regard visa and immigration restrictions and ownership
of real estate. As can well be imagined, the Baltic States are highly critical of
what they consider Russian meddling in their internal affairs.
The Russians have several policy alternatives at their disposal.
Two of the more prominent options have already been discussed: linkage
with troop withdrawal, and possible intervention if the Yeltsin government
should feel boxed in with no other alternatives. Currently, the inflammatory
remarks made by Stankevich and the tough talk of Kozyrev, pertaining to the
defense of Russian interests and Russian speakers, seem to be nothing more
than "saber rattling." Even Yeltsin's decree linking troop withdrawal with
human rights issues seems to be less than serious.
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2. Sanctions
One possibility that may bring a resolution to the crisis, or, on
the other hand, cause a total "meltdown" of all negotiations, is the
imposition of Russian sanctions on the Baltic States. Sergei Stankevich called
for economic sanctions to be imposed on the Baltic States if they continued to
engage in discriminatory practices. 84 A short time later, Stankevich again
expressed concern over the minorities question, and called for sanctions
against Estonia and Latvia where, he asserted, millions of Russians had been
denied basic rights. 85
Stankevich, however, is not the only one pressing his demands
for sanctions. The Russian parliament passed a resolution threatening action
against Estonia for "human rights violations." The members of parliament
then called upon the government to impose sanctions against Estonia if the
discrimination did not stop. Sfi
In September 1>>92, sanctions were still the topic of discussion
when acting Russian Prime Minister Gaidar said the question of Sanctions
against the Baltics had yet to be resolved. 87
Sergei Zotov, chief Russian negotiator for talks on troop
withdrawals from Latvia, said that Latvia was pursuing an "apartheid policy"
toward nearly half its population-the Russians and other Slavs. He warned
that Russia could turn off Latvia's gas pipeline and reduce the supply of
industrial raw materials. Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Churkin,
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raised the possibility of imposing economic sanctions against Latvia and
Estonia if human rights violations did not cease. 88
For all the talk, no sanctions have been directed against the
Baltic States to date. But, as the record indicates, the thought has certainly
crossed Russian minds in the past, such as Gorgachev's economic blockade of
Lithuania. Presently, it remains to be seen how far the Russians can be
pushed before sanctions shift from being a possibility to a reality.
3. European/International Organizations
Another option the Russian government has at its disposal, and
has used to some degree, is international organizations. The Russians have
predominantly used these organizations to present their case for ethnic rights
violations in the Baltics, but they have not met with a great deal of success.
In March 1992, Russia was a signatory in establishing the Baltic
Sea Council. On March 5th, while addressing the members of the newly
formed council, Foreign Minister Kozyrev criticized the Baltic States for
failing to "respect the human rights of Russian-speakers" and asked the
council to appoint a trouble-shooter on minority rights. Although other
foreign ministers pointed out that such a function would be duplicating the
work of the CSCE, this represented one of the first occasions that any Russian
representative had taken the minorities issue to an independent European
organization. 89
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Again, the Russians tried taking their case to an international
organization when the Russian delegation, at the CSCE foreign ministers
meeting in Helsinki, circulated a statement protesting Estonia's new
citizenship law. The statement read, in part, that Russia "reserves the right to
use relevant international mechanisms to draw the world's attention to the
human rights situation in Estonia following the law on citizenship."90
Sergei Zotov, head of the delegation holding talks with Latvia,
told a group of high level officials in Moscow that the Russian Supreme
Soviet must not delay ratification of the Latvian-Russian treaty endorsed by
President Yeltsin on 13 January 1992. Zotov argued that once the treaty was
ratified, Russia could ask the CSCE to examine the human rights aspects of
certain Latvian laws. 91
Even though Russian delegates were trying their best to get the
other foreign ministers of the CSCE to see things their way on the minorities
issue in the Baltics, most of the CSCE governments had other ideas about the
pace of Russian troop withdrawals. During proceedings at Helsinki the
Latvian Supreme Council Chairman, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, pointed out the
instability resulting from the presence of Russian troops in Latvia. As a
result, it became not only a topic of discussion, but was referred to in the
summit's final document. 9 2
The Russian Parliament took a different approach and appealed
to the UN. The parliament passed a resolution threatening action against
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Estonia for "human rights violations." The resolution also appealed to the
UN to raise the issue during the current session of the General Assembly.93
Despite Russia's attempts in both the UN and the CSCE to gather
world support for alleged violations of human rights in the Baltics, it suffered
two major setbacks. First, Representatives of the Federation of Ethnic
Communities of Europe found little in the way of ethnic discrimination
during a trip they made to Lithuania. Secondly, when Western diplomats
visited Latvia and found no evidence of "human rights violations", the US
embassy press attache, James Kenny, said that as far as he was aware, the Baltic
States were observing human rights. He noted that Russia had failed to
provide factual information to back up its claim of human rights violations
in response to US queries. The German Ambassador did note, however, that
the manner in which Latvian authorities were handling citizenship and
language issues was causing some problems. 94
D. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS/REGIONAL STABILITY
European and international organizations and governments have
taken a keen interest in events in the Baltics. For West European nations,
regional stability in the Baltic region equates to East European stability, and
ultimately, overall European security. To appreciate this kind of reasoning,
the paper will discuss : (1) NATO's position on the Baltic issue, and (2) the
impressions of other European and international organizations.
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1. NATO
Concerns for regional stability have prompted a number of visits
and inspections by NATO officials to evaluate the situation. Sir Brian Kenny,
a deputy supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe, visited
Latvia to discuss the conceptual basis of Latvia's defense.95 German
Bundestag deputies also concerned about defense issues were very interested
in a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops. 96
Juris Dobelis, Latvian parliamentary deputy, reported that
during a meeting with NATO officials in March 1992, NATO was interested
in the stability of the Baltic States, but could not address itself to matters
related to the withdrawal of Russian troops until a formal accord had been
reached by Latvia and Russia regarding the pullout.97
On 27 April 19^2, a seminar organized by the North Atlantic
Assembly and the Latvian parliament discussed problems of stability and
security in the Baltic region tor purposes of allowing NATO to become better
acquainted with the situation in the Baltic States.98
Toward the end of 1992, NATO was once again actively engaged
in the Baltic question. NATO Military Committee Chairman General Vigleik
Eide held talks with officers of the Estonian Defense Force. Eide noted that
the three Baltic States belonged to NATO's area of interest, because "NATO is
interested in maintaining the stability and freedom of European countries."99
This was a significant step not only for the Baltics, but also for NATO. It
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represented a more determined stand than NATO had previously assumed
with the Baltics.
2. Other Organizations
In addition to the limited informational and organizational
tempo of NATO's involvement, other organizations and countries have
taken a more vigorous stand on the human rights issue and Russia's
attempted linkage of that to the withdrawal of its troops. At a meeting of the
North Atlantic Assembly the Russian delegation agreed to hold informal
talks attended by observers trom NATO on arranging a timetable for the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. 100
While visiting the Baltics French President Mitterrand, speaking
before the Lithuanian parliament, told the legislators that the continued
presence of Russian troops in the Baltic States was "abnormal and
shocking."! 01
International pressure continued to mount as representatives to
the International Crans Montana Forum on European Integration supported
the Baltic States' appeal for an early withdrawal of Russian troops.
Additionally, Secretary of State James Baker reported on 23 June that
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin had discussed the troop withdrawal issue, and
that President Bush told Yeltsin that the withdrawal could be achieved more
quickly if new recruits were not sent to the Baltic States to replace troops
whose tours of duty had ended. 102
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The Group of Seven leading industrial nations issued a
statement urging Russia to establish a timetable on the withdrawal of troops
from the Baltic States. Correspondingly, a group of Finnish organizations
appealed to the CSCE to "make insistent demands for an end to the military
occupation of the Baltic States," and the US Senate voted to impose
restrictions on aid to Russia after twelve months unless it made significant
progress toward withdrawing its troops from the Baltic States. 103
UN experts on human rights arrived in Latvia, at Latvia's
request, to assess the human rights situation in Latvia, especially with regard
to Russians and other Slavs, 104 and Erika Bruce, representing NATO, visited
Lithuania to make preparations for a seminar on "The Baltic Region in the
New Europe."105
By the end of 1992 this avalanche of international sentiment on
the plight of the Baltics had not gone unnoticed by the Russian government.
The Commander-in-Chief of CIS forces, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, said that the
military withdrawal from the Baltic States should not be pushed because it
could have explosive consequences for both Russia and the Baltic States. He
criticized appeals by the Baltic governments to NATO and the CSCE about
withdrawals, as well as the holding of referenda on the issue. 106
There is ample evidence, as well as little doubt, that regional
stability in the Baltics is a vital question to the European community. The
issue of human rights for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers and its
54
impact upon the question of troop withdrawal is an antagonistic correlation
not easily resolved by the two bickering factions. For the Russians economic
and political turmoil on the home front makes the withdrawal of Russian
troops a problematic decision because of genuine concern for ethnic Russians
and the more complex problems that reside beneath the surface of this
current issue. In the Baltic States, local citizens and governments continue to
make it clear that the "occupiers" are not welcome. If withdrawal becomes a
long and tedious process that could potentially take years to accomplish, then
at some point during that time there may be an explosive confrontation.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL RUSSIAN MOTIVES
A. BACKGROUND
Thus far, the thrust of this paper has been to give consideration to all
sides of this current problem regarding the difficult question of ethnic
Russians in the Baltic region and the human rights violations they allege
have occurred.
But, evidence is beginning to suggest that the issue runs deeper than
just the debate over human rights violations or discrimination.
Domestically, politically, economically, and militarily, a great deal is at
stake in today's turbulent Russia. There is certainly reason to believe that
elements exist within the Yeltsin government, and Russia in general, that are
genuinely concerned about the condition of ethnic Russians in the Baltics, but
wish to negotiate a peaceful solution to the problem. There are, however,
militant and conservative voices that have taken up the cause as a method of
advancing other concerns.
These elements, whether they be military or political in nature, have
recognized the issue of human rights as a vehicle to achieve other policy
objectives, primarily as a pretense to maintaining a Russian presence in the
Baltic area.
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Therefore, the balance of this paper will examine the Russian position
and possible foreign policy decisions they might make within the broader
context of their intent with respect to the current developing Baltic dilemma,
and discuss the link between the human rights issue, on one hand, and the
possible objectives of the Russians, on the other.
To accomplish this task, this chapter will proceed in the following
manner:
- Immediate Russian Concerns.
- Strategic Concerns.
- Human Rights Violations: Pretense For Ambition?
B. IMMEDIATE RUSSIAN CONCERNS
The issue of human rights violations, in keeping with its complex
character, has spawned a number of other issues that rank rather high on the
Russian Foreign Policy list of priorities. These concerns deal almost
exclusively with the Russian military and why the question of human rights
violations was linked to the withdrawal of Russian forces from the three
Baltic States. A discussion of the items most germane to the current debate
include: (1) treatment of Russian soldiers, (2) adequate housing for the troops
as they return to Russian soil, and (3) those who encourage prudence in the
withdrawal of Russian soldiers.
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1. Treatment Of Russian Soldiers
Russia contends that not only the civilian and retired military
populations of ethnic Russians have been treated badly in the Baltic States,
but the current active duty military are suffering similar abuses. The Russian
government has therefore insisted that the Baltic governments protect and
provide for these troops, or no further negotiation about time-tables or
withdrawal can proceed.
Thousands of Russian troops remaining in the Baltics are
dispirited and angry at the petty harassments and humiliations on the part of
the newly independent states. Examples of these abuses were outlined in an
interview with Lt. Gen. Fyodor I. Melnichuk, First Deputy Commander of
Russian troops in the Baltics. Melnichuk complains that there is no
agreement about how the troops should be treated and that many laws that
concern them are adopted unilaterally. Other recurrent problems cited
include: former Soviet military apartments have been confiscated by Latvia,
and there have been cases of Latvians evicting Russian officers from flats
vacated by other troops; no non-commissioned officer can walk through
Latvian town without an accompanying officer; military trucks and cars are
under constant surveillance resulting in numerous clashes; truck convoys are
stopped at virtually every street corner and searched; electric power and water
have been intentionally turned off at military installations; convoys have
been shot at; and many officers, because of the sinking value of the Ruble, are
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paid less than pensioners. Melnichuk believed the troops should be
withdrawn, but stressed it should proceed in a civilized manner.
i
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Although not elaborating on the conditions to which his troops
have been subjected, Col. Gen. L. Maiorov, the Commander of Russia's
Northwestern Group of Forces warned he would take resolute measures to
defend military inventory, honor, and dignity of the troops. 108
The question of shabby treatment, and a concern for the
dilapidating Russian army has not only been on the minds of the upper
echelons of the military stationed in the Baltics, but on the minds of the rank
and file and military pensioners as well. In a letter to the Russian Supreme
Soviet Representatives from the Latvian Veterans and the Northwestern
Group of Forces Officers Union outlined their grievances. They characterized
withdrawal of forces as being hasty, premature, panicky and criminally
disgraceful. They pointed to the horrendous living conditions military
members and their families must endure and the fate of officers from
disbanded units who now find themselves jobless, homeless, and without
citizenship. They advocated taking steps to avert what they described as a vile
capitulation by the Russian army and espoused that the withdrawal of troops
be completed by 1997-1999 and only if all social injustices were resolved. 109
When addressing journalists, Commander-in-Chief of Russian
Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, explained that none of the Russian troops is
to blame for having been stationed in the Baltics and appeals to NATO and
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CSCE cannot resolve the problem. He emphasized that only through talks
can a compromise be reached. 110
The frustration of ineffectual policies over troop withdrawals,
and the treatment of the Russian military, was reflected in remarks by
Russian Defense Minister Grachev. He said that indignation over moral
pressure is growing among Russian servicemen in the Baltic States, where for
instance, local banks refuse to give the soldiers their salaries sent from
Russian banks. He urged the Congress either pull out the troops without
delay, or allow them to stay on the condition that Russian servicemen be
provided all social guarantees and their rights be observed. 111 The second
alternative, of course, is the policy most feared by leaders of the Baltic States
and casts suspicion on Russian intentions in the Baltic region.
General Grachev, again, had an opportunity to express his
opinion on the treatment of Russian soldiers in the Baltics. During an
address before the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies, he said the
military and their families must not be abandoned in some godforsaken place
where the soldiers are suffering psychological abuse and not being paid. He
said we are well aware of the attitudes of the Baltic State's leadership toward
these forces, and no amount of persuasion and negotiation with these states
has produced positive results. Grachev understands the wave of indignation
felt by the troops in the Baltics and stands solidly behind them. 112
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2. Adequate Housing
Another severe problem faced by the Russian Defense Ministry,
and a plausible reason for linking questions of troop withdrawal to the
human rights issue, has been the tremendous pace with which the
withdrawals in all former republics has occurred and the question of where to
house them.
The Baltic States, as mentioned earlier, have not been extremely
sympathetic with this Russian difficulty, but Lithuania has offered to
contribute part of the funds toward building such housing.
The housing issue, just like the abuse of Russian forces, has
created controversy and cast further doubt upon Russia's commitment to
withdrawal.
In such a discission, concerning adequate housing for returning
soldiers, it is worthwhile to note approximately how many troops this entails.
Customarily, the Russians have always been tight lipped about
matters pertaining to the military and defense. In the case of troop strength
in the Baltics there seems to be continuity. When asked for precise and
current figures for the troop presence in the Baltic region at the North
Atlantic Assembly's seminar on Baltic security, the Russian representative
simply did not reply.
i
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In past decades, Russian forces in this area numbered as high as
600,000, but 92 estimates put the figure at 130,000.^4 When comparing this
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with the overall estimated return of over 500,000 troops to Russian soil, it
becomes clear why housing is such a problem. 115
Currently, considering officers alone, there are more than
100,000 officers and their families that lack housing, and this figure is expected
to double in 1993. The Yeltsin government has earmarked additional
funding for housing construction to provide proper living conditions, but the
efforts appear to have done little to resolve the problem. 116
According to government estimates, it will cost over 47 billion
Rubles to build housing for just officers and their families leaving the Baltic
States. This would entail 6, 914 leaving Estonia, 17,899 leaving Latvia, and
9,408 to leave Lithuania. To assist in this massive effort, Western financial
aid has been offered once a troop withdrawal accord is hammered out. 117
NATO headquarters has also taken issue with the debate on
housing expressing its concern over the delays in withdrawal. A spokesman
for NATO advised Russia not to delay the pullout despite the logistical
problems it posed in housing returning troops. 118 The U.S. State Department
estimates that approximately 40% of the 130,000 troops have left, but this is
combined with the hundreds of thousands being pulled out of Eastern
Europe, and Russia is feeling the strain. 119
At the local level, officers are also voicing concern at what they
see as an untenable situation. One regimental chief of staff stationed in
Lithuania said it was understandable why servicemen object to a speedy
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withdrawal especially when new deployment bases are not yet ready. He
indicated that if housing was not ready at his regiments new site, they would
remain in Lithuania. 120
The Baltic States have started to recognize the importance in
cooperating with Russia on the issue of housing if they harbor any hopes of
being free from their Russian occupiers. Estonia has realized the predicament
it faces in this regard, and delegations from both countries reached the
decision to apply to the CSCE and other organizations for assistance in
financing construction jobs. 121
When interviewed, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Gromov
said the housing problem was extremely urgent and needed to be resolved
without fail. He stated that the number of servicemen without apartments in
districts where it is planned to transfer these units varies between 2,000 and
19,000. A total of 1,600 apartment blocks, 580 facilities for services, and 2,500
storage facilities need to be built before 1995. To do all this, using the
resources of the Ministry of Defense alone, is unrealistic 122
Apart from the military's problems, there are even more
complex reasons behind the lack of progress in building adequate housing.
The disintegration of the Russian economy has disrupted material supply
lines and thrown budgets and labor markets into chaos. Even the military
high command has been, at times, less than helpful in pursuing these goals
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and has used the issue of inadequate housing as a potential weapon to belabor
civilian "politicians" and the existing process.
3. Prudence With Hasty Withdrawal
Hopefully, it is becoming apparent that, for a number of reasons,
not everyone in the Russian government and military establishment is
enthusiastic about removing Russian troops from the Baltic area.
A number of conservative political organizations and factions
have sprouted on the Russian political landscape, but none have truly
achieved a stable political base, nor a clean mandate from a sizeable
constituency, to individually claim political power. Nonetheless, these
organizations have taken various positions on political issues.
Previously, the paper mentioned organizations such as veterans
groups and the Northwest Group of Forces Officers Union that have taken a
very clear stand on the issue of troop withdrawal and human rights
advocating that the pace, and even necessity, of troop withdrawal be
reconsidered.
Other organizations and individual politicians have called for
the same. Chairman, Victor Aksyuchits, of the Russian Christians
Democratic Movement supported President Yeltsin's suspension of Baltic
Troop withdrawal saying, "Russia should not permit the troop withdrawal to
look like a panicky retreat."123
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The Baltic Region officers Assemblies Coordinating Council in a
letter to the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies emphasized the security
dilemma the Russian State faces as a result of the drawdown of Baltic forces.
Flight time per aircraft is down to only 25-30 hours. Baltic ships are tied up in
port with no fuel to sail, and ground units are not properly manned to
organize field sorties. 124 In short, training has ground to a halt due to
insufficient resources of manpower and material.
Reflecting on the double edged sword upon which the Russian
military finds itself, Defense Minister Grachev commented that the military
is being criticized for the undue haste in the withdrawal of forces, even
though there are schedules tor such withdrawals that have not been
approved. On the other hand, the military is criticized for procrastinating. 125
Therein probably lies a truth to a situation fraught with many shades of gray,
and that is, no matter what the Russian military does, it is bound to make at
least one side or the other unhappy. No wonder so many are beginning to
ask, why try?
C STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
To understand the Russian reluctance to leave the Baltic area, and why
they may be using the issue of human rights as a pretense to maintain a
presence there, the following items must be discussed to appreciate its
strategic significance: (1) the various military installations, (2) strategic early
warning site, and (3) the Baltics as a security buffer.
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1. Military Installations
Despite all the official jargon, withdrawal of Russian forces is
low on the Russian list of priorities, and the troops already withdrawn have
been nothing more than a token gesture. 126
Major military installations are numerous and extensive. There
are seven naval bases located in the Baltic region, counting the base at
Kaliningrad. Lithuania has one site located at Klaipeda. Latvia has three sites
in Liepaja, Ventspils, and Riga. Estonia brings in the rest with a site at
Paldiski and another at Tallinn. The navy numbers approximately 87,000
sailors and airmen which are not likely to be included in the estimate of the
roughly 130,000 troops attributed to the Northwest Group of Forces in the
Baltics. 127
The navy base of Tallinn, located in Estonia, is the home port of
the Northern Group of the Baltic Fleet and has some 70 ships of corvette size
or smaller. Latvia is the base for more than 132 warships including the entire
Baltic Fleet Submarine Force of 20 vessels located at Liepaja. Lithuania has a
minimal naval presence of only about five ships. 128
In addition to its naval base, Kaliningrad Oblast contains three
motorized-rifle divisions, two tank divisions, one artillery division, and one
naval infantry coastal defense outfit. Altogether, these troops number at least
80,000 and they are also not counted in the 130,000 figure for the Baltics. 12?
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The three Baltic States house numerous other military
organizations. Two airborne divisions, three fighter bomber air bases, one
motorized-rifle division, and one naval infantry coastal defense outfit occupy
Lithuania. There are four fighter bomber air bases, one air defense base, one
tank division, and one ABM radar site at Skrunda in Latvia. Finally, Estonia
has three air defense bases, two fighter bomber bases, and one motorized-rifle
division. 130
2. Strategic Early Warning Radar
As can be seen from the proceeding section, the Russian military
has a considerable investment in the Baltic States in terms of the facilities
they have constructed and manpower it takes to make the machinery work.
However, another huge investment that the Soviets made was the ballistic
missile early warning radar site built at Skrunda in Latvia.
The operation at Skrunda represents a huge phased-array radar,
and it is one of seven such radars used to warn the former Soviet Union of
missile attack.1 31 The radar would be very expensive to relocate, and because
the boundaries have moved, vis-a-vis the creation of the three independent
Baltic States, Moscow is now facing a degradation in its early warning system
because the Skrunda site no longer complies with the 1972 ABM treaty which
says it must be located on the periphery of Russia. 132 There was a time when
latvia may have allowed Russia to operate the site in the interests of East-
West stability, but that time has probably passed. 133
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All the same, Russia has tried to maintain control of the site
under the auspices and interests of global security, and that they pose no
threat to the independence of Latvia. 134
3. Security Buffer
Russia has long been interested in providing a buffer around
itself to discourage would be attackers. They have viewed the Baltics as a
potential avenue of attack and have used the buffer concept in order to blunt
an offensive blow should an attack occur. In this regard, Baltic Republics
represented a sensitive secuntv zone, off-limits to foreigners, with numerous
restrictions placed on the local inhabitants. The Russians knew from their
experiences in World War II, when Hitler's advance bottled up their Baltic
fleet, that it would also present a tempting avenue of approach for NATO
bombers. 135
The Baltic Military District was part of what formed the now
obsolete Western Military District. They were considered second echelon
troops that would follow behind the Groups of Forces used to spear head an
attack on Europe. Now, because of the change in military balance, there is no
longer a need for maintaining large numbers of ground forces in the Baltics,
but Russians believe it would be in their best interests to maintain at least air
and ballistic missile defenses, if not naval forces in the Baltic States. 136 Here is
where world opinion and, more specifically, the opinions of the Baltic
governments part company with the Russians.
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D. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: PRETENSE FOR AMBITION
As can be seen, the expenditure of money and manpower in the
spheres of military and economic assets amassed by the former Soviet Union
in the Baltic Republics represents an investment that the Russian
government must find difficult to abandon. This paper has argued that the
issue of human rights abuses, and discrimination of ethnic Russians in the
Baltic States, is a political problem that could be used by some as a pretense for
other foreign policy objectives that the Russians may seek. Very high on the
list is their desire to maintain a presence in the Baltic States and their ability
to continue influencing the course of events in those three countries.
Nationalists are driven by a need to preserve, what they perceive to be, the
interests of the Russian State in this region. This paper will look at those
topics in the following order: (1) the shift in Russian policies /interests, and
(2) the desire to maintain a presence in the Baltic area.
1. Russian Policies/Interests
In the days and months immediately after the fall of the Soviet
Empire, the Yeltsin government had set two goals for Russia's recovery. The
first was securing Russia's entry into the civilized community, and secondly,
to enlist maximum support of Russia's efforts toward transformation into a
democratic, market oriented country. 1 37 Russia pursued both of these foreign
policy goals. In the process, they achieved the status of a world power,
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secured pledges for substantial amounts of economic assistance, and was
accepted as the legal successor to the Soviet Union. 138
On questions of foreign policy matters with the various CIS
states, even though tough talk about protecting the rights of Russians living
abroad can routinely be heard from conservative voices within the
government, Foreign Minister Kozyrev has, himself, said that it rests within
the best interests of Russia to avoid intrusive actions and abide by
international law when dealing with their immediate neighbors. 139 But, the
principle that human rights do not represent an internal issue to be left to the
discretion of foreign governments, and the idea that a governments
obligations to protect the rights of ethnic minorities takes precedence over
national sovereignty, is gaining ground. 140
Concurrent with this line of reasoning, the voices in Russia for a
more aggressive policy remain and grow even stronger. Russia's ties with
members of the CIS are likelv to remain a contentious topic for quite some
time, and those who advocate a more intrusive and aggressive policy will
probably find further justification for doing so. 141
In the Baltics, this justification has come to represent the
struggle between ethnic Russians and the alleged human rights violations
they say are occurring.
The debate has naturally had quite a profound impact upon the
foreign ministry and moderates within the government that would prefer a
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less combative approach to Russian Foreign Policy. As the paper reported
earlier, two main figures of this debate are the Russian Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev and Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich. Stankevich
is a proponent for the creation of a new ministry for the affairs of the CIS to be
placed under his control. Kozyrev, the voice of moderation, has opposed this
move for it represents a setback of major proportions to Russian moderates
and would herald a much more intrusive and coercive policy. Indeed,
Stankevich has argued that Russia possesses no clear concept of its national
interests. He believes Russian Foreign Policy with former republics calls for a
special independent area of Russian Foreign Policy. 142 Kozyrev, on the other
hand, has warned that the military and security organs will step out of the
moderates control and "sooner or later they will slough off the democratic
skin that is an unnecessary nuisance to them. "143
It is difficult to estimate how long kozyrev will be able to
maintain his position and his influence over foreign policy, but other
powerful organizations are emerging that are gaining influence over the
control and direction of Russian Foreign Policy.
One such organization is the Security Council. The Security
Council and its chief, Yurii Skokov, had its powers expanded on 7 July 1992 by
a decree signed by Yeltsin. A major provision of the decree directed the heads
of all ministries to fulfill the orders of the council which some have
compared to the old Politburo. When questioned about the Politburo
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analogy, Skokov replied no such connection existed, but the Security Council
represented a legally constituted body that guaranteed the president the
opportunity of carrying out all measures to protect the interests of the state. 144
Stankevich and other conservatives have seized upon this as a tool for
promoting their heavy handed approach to foreign policy.
Even with the creation of a second organization, the Council for
Foreign and Defense Policy, whose stated goal is to reduce the disagreement of
various political factions by creating a stable political center in the pursuit of
Russian Foreign Policy, the moderates are losing ground in their influence
over foreign policy questions. National patriotic forces are gaining control
over Russian Foreign Policy toward the former republics. This could most
likely mean an increasingly active defense of the rights of ethnic Russians
and less cooperation with the West. The moderates have done little to press
their case and, in the process, have seen their political power and influence
slip away. Oleg Rumyantsev, the executive secretary of the Supreme Soviet
Constitutional committee observed: "The democrats have thoughtlessly
handed over the idea of patriotism and national resurrection" to their
conservative opponents. 145
In negotiations, specifically over the question of troop
withdrawal in the Baltics, Russian policy has left little room for the Baltic
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States to maneuver with the tough conditions they have proposed. The
Baltics must agree to the following nine points:
1. Grant legal status to Russian forces for normal functioning.
2. For the time being, accept Russia's strategic installations.
3. Drop compensation claims for damages between 1940-91.
4. Assist in construction of housing for departing troops.
5. Guarantee transit rights for Kaliningrad military freight.
6. Provide compensation for property vacated by troops.
7. Guarantee social security /rights for retired officers.
8. Alter laws that infringe on rights of Russian-speakers.
9. Drop territorial claims on land USSR annexed after WWII. 146
Despite all of the optimistic statements from both the Yeltsin
camp and the Baltic side for cooperation and the hope for a negotiated
settlement, the Russian demands have remained very consistent and, for that
matter, the Baltic counter Proposals have remained equally so. The real
question in the minds of most Baltic leaders is what would be the
consequences if they accede to the Russian demands? It is reasonable to say
that Russia wants to continue its dominance of the Baltic States and, as long
as they do, it is a safe bet that there is little the Baltic countries can do to make
the Russians leave. 147 The peoples of the Baltic States, who must face the
problems of the large troop presence on a daily basis, are undoubtedly aware
of this fact. 148
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With the expensive network of military bases positioned in the
Baltics, Russia's Ministry of Defense has also played a key role in both the
political debate as well as influencing Russian security policy. Generals sitting
in the most powerful positions of the ministry have made it perfectly clear
that they intend to both maintain Russia as a "great power" and stem the
strategic retreat. They have also intimated, in this regard, that they consider
the Baltic States to be a part of Moscow's "sphere of influence" and will not
stand for any Western interference on this matter. 149
Baltic leaders fully understand such sentiments. They believe
Russia plans to maintain its military presence because the region is vital to
Russian security interests. 15" Russia has confirmed such suspicions insisting
that it is in Russia's strategic interests to retain the radar station at Skrunda in
addition to other key facilities. 151
This tough, new language certainly suggests a new turn for
Russian Foreign Policy as Moscow seeks to defend its own strategic interests
against the claims of other former republics. It has raised eyebrows in
Western governments that Russia has retained some of the Soviet Union's
old habits including, a dictatorial negotiating style, and placing high priority
on military interests. 152
Somewhat more difficult to prove, but just as worrisome to
many, is the darker side of Russian policy. The possibility exists that Russian
hardliners have used, or will use, remnants of the KGB, or other Russian
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special forces, to foment ethnic conflict thereby giving the military further
justification for intrusive actions. 153
Russia's interests do not run exclusively along the lines of
military dominance, but there are also economic interests at stake that are
vital to maintaining Russia's overall stability and security.
The Baltic States rely heavily on the import of Russian goods (62-
65%). Conversely, then, it follows that the Russian economy relies heavily
on exporting to the Baltic States. Not only are the exports important, but the
sea lines of communication to the rest of Europe lie through the Baltic sea
ports. Russia is vitally interested in continuing to use sea ports in the
Ventspils, and klaipeda for its oil export to the West. They also want to
continue to use an oil refinery in Mazerkiai. 154
The point can be made that the Baltics have the most advanced
part of the former USSR national economy, including some of the defense
projects. 155 Over the last few decades, huge investments were made by the
Soviets toward construction and upkeep of Baltic sea ports that was
incomparable with the small contributions made by the Baltic republics. One
of the most serious consequences of the Union's collapse has been to
drastically cut Russia's access to the seas, fencing Russia off from other
European countries and pushing it deeper into Eurasia. 156
From a foreign policy perspective, and keeping in mind Russia's
best interests, which they will most certainly do, the President of the
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European Bank, Attali said, "it would be a folly to fence Russia off from
Europe. Similar attempts have always ended in War."157
The world has come to think of the new Russia in terms of
striving for democratic ideals and joining the world economy, but the fact
remains that many Russians are still holding tightly to the old ways and are
quite plain about what they want. This was the view of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of Russia's Parliament pertaining to Russian Foreign policy and
interests. They believe Russian foreign policy must be based on a principle
that proclaims the entire geopolitical space of the former (Soviet) Union a
sphere of vital interests, and that Russia must assume the role of political and
military guarantor of stability on all the territory of the former USSR. 158 This
goes will beyond the perfectly proper concerns of the Russian government for
Russian minorities abroad. 1 5y
2. Russian Presence
There have been numerous statements by government officials
that advocate maintaining a Russian presence in the Baltics. This paper has
discussed the possible policy issues that would motivate the Russians to
remain, but there is also ample evidence to suggest that the human rights
issue was the right cause at precisely the right time. All that remained for the
military to do was jump on the wagon and help the conservative elements
fan the flames of discontent already brewing inside the government.
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The Russian military, for its part, has resented the recent
depiction of the Baltic troops as an "occupying army." 1W) Historically, they
have viewed their mission in the Baltic region as one of deterring aggression;
protecting the motherland. Gorbachev said the troops should not be
withdrawn from the Baltics since, in his view, they represented a "stabilizing
factor" that could prevent a large-scale war. 161
Stability is certainly a key factor in Russia's beleaguered
periphery. Given the human rights issue and the crescendo of recent events
in the Baltics, Russia's political elite might be worried that the Baltics could
turn into a violent situation much like other ethnic disturbances have in
former republics. Back in 1991, when things were looking bad in the Ukraine
and Kazakhstan, Boris Yeltsin had threatened to intervene to annex
predominantly Russian-speaking areas in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
There is no question his behavior was less than diplomatic, but, at the time,
he was also expressing a self-evident truth about what will happen when
people start killing each other. 1^2 Not many country's military organizations
will permit bloody disintegration if it possesses the ability to stop it. Should
this start to occur, for example, in the Baltic States, the Russian military, like
the armed forces in most countries, is willing to initiate the bloodshed to stop
the disintegration. 163
Hopefully, the situation over human rights will resolve itself
peacefully in the Baltic countries, but people must realize the Russian
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military is prepared to take what measures are deemed necessary to secure the
interests of the state and its people.
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia, obviously referring to possible economic sanctions against the Baltics
said that Russia would ideally like to get back all the Baltic, but in any event,
it will submit to economic crisis, because no one can live without energy. He
continued by saying Russia will not need a single soldier to solve the Baltic
issue. Russia would make it so the Baltic States would ask to be taken back,
only not as a republic, but as a Baltic governorate. All will be citizens of
Russia. 164
In a similar vein, when Estonia was engaged in one of its many
negotiating sessions with Russia, the draft of a Russian position paper
indicated that Moscow thought the Baltic States should pay Russian troops to
remain on their territories in order to guarantee their security. 165
Bearing down on the issue of human rights, Sergey Stepaskin,
Chairman of the Russia Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security,
hinted at a continued presence in the Baltics when he said the people must
know the Russian government would not abandon them to the whim of
fate.166
Returning from a tour of the Baltic States, the Director of the
Norwegian Foreign policy Institute arrived at a similar conclusion. That
being, the Russian command hopes "officially to prolong its military presence
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in the Baltics just in case the Russian-speaking population becomes an object
of repression. "i 67
The Baltic countries have apparently, themselves, come to the
same conclusion. Representatives from the Russian and Latvian parliaments
stated that Russia has not utilized all of its alternatives for enabling the
speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia. 168 The Lithuanian press
secretary to Landsbergis said the Russians do not want to withdraw their
troops, "they want to exploit the issue of social guarantees. "16y
Linking troop withdrawal negotiations with the issue of human
rights in the Baltic States has been an especially worrying turn of events.
Recent developments in Moscow's relations with the Baltic States has been
difficult to understand with respect to its current policies. The possibilities for
these policies could be the result of :
- A genuine turn to the right for the Yeltsin government.
- Growing confusion between the people involved in
negotiations with the Baltic States.
- A short term tactical ploy by yeltsin to
defuse the nationalist right. 170
The problem has certainly kept the heads of government in the
Baltic States engaged in a relentless pursuit to hammer out an agreement
with the Russians for removal of the troops, but negotiations continue to
break down, and a substantive agreement continues to allude even the most
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dogged attempts to bring home a treaty- Latvia and Estonia representatives,
experienced at the bargaining table, continue to argue that Russia is raising
the human rights issues onlv to sustain its hegemony over the region and to
delay withdrawing its forces. |71
It is entirely possible that, eventually, the Russian soldiers will
be gone. In its wake, they will leave behind a sizeable and worried Russian
minority. If militant nationalists in Russia ever manage to oust Boris Yeltsin,
they have promised to march the Troops back. 172
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V. CONCLUSION
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, just as in other former republics of the
old Soviet empire, and like Russia itself, face enormous challenges. They
must embrace new economic concepts that offer tremendous opportunities
for acceptance into the European community and portend a better life, full of
promise and prosperity, for the citizens of these countries. By the same token,
the course they have set for themselves requires difficult choices that have
resulted in certain hardships and deprivations for the people.
Politically, the principles of democratic government they have
envisioned for themselves, and are actively creating, seeks to protect the
blessings of liberty and independence they fought so hard to achieve. During
the struggle, Baltic patriots sacrificed their lives for the dream, but the quest
for freedom did not die.
Culturally they seek to restore their heritage by reinvigorating their
language, religion, customs, and traditions that were almost completely
eradicated by the process of Russification carried out by the Soviet Regime.
They are proud people whose feelings of patriotism can now emerge
unshackled by the reprieve they received from their imprisonment. With
the sight of their countries flags flying high and the strains of national
anthems, long silenced by their captors, being sung once again, the urges of
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nationalism have begun tugging relentlessly at the coattails of those whose
job it is to chart the new course.
Their "big brother" to the East has seen this kind of thing in the past
and has seldom approved. Russia has also heard the cries of its people living
in the Baltic region who claim to be disadvantaged by the new democracies,
and it has not neglected their pleas for help.
The Baltic States, through a combination of their own doing and the
stubborn refusal of Russia to negotiate, now find that the stirrings of
nationalism, and their resentment for the Russian presence in those
countries, may have put them in a situation where their desire to remove the
last vestiges of the yoke of oppression, the Russian army, may have been
placed in jeopardy.
Neither the Baltic States, nor Russia, because of the political and
economic instability they both face, can afford to become embroiled in the
issue of human rights violations of ethnic Russians.
For the Baltic's part, it they cannot resolve the issue by legislating fair
and equal citizenship and voting laws, as well as curbing the discriminatory
behavior of their indigenous citizenry toward the Russian speaking non-
citizens and the russian military, they risk losing the independence and
sovereignty they fought so hard to achieve.
For the Russian's part, the issue of human rights violations has been
the rallying cry for conservative elements of the Russian government who
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resent the empire's collapse and the progressive direction it has taken toward
democracy and capitalism. The issue has also provided the military with the
perfect alibi for maintaining a presence in this region.
Elements in both the political and military spheres of the government
have been greatly displeased with the retreat of Russian forces on the
country's periphery. The practical issues of housing the returning soldiers
and their families, the enormous investment in facilities, and the
contentious issue of the shabby treatment and harassment the troops receive
at the hands of the Baltic citizens, have pushed the conservative elements in
Russia to the edge. Add to this the strategic imperatives that Russia perceives
to be in its best interests, and all of a sudden the human rights issue seems
like a legitimate reason with which to link the progress of troop withdrawal
negotiations. It enables the Russian government to contemplate maintaining
a continuous presence in the region through the foreign policy of protecting
the human rights of ethnic Russians.
The Baltic States have much to fear in this respect. The remaining
communists and nationalists, within the Russian government, are exerting
increasing pressure on the Yeltsin administration pushing the President into
making conservative decisions that some consider threatening to the
democratic process in Russia . These decisions reflect badly on the stability of
the Yeltsin government and the weakness of the country's democratic
institutions. 173
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The Russian government has been criticized by democratic forces
within the intelligentsia of undemocratic tendencies, and with good reason.
State Secretary Burbulis has made no attempt to conceal his desire to establish
an authoritarian system, and presidential advisor Stankevich has called for a
government with a strong central power base. Indeed, the Russian leadership
seems to have inherited their communist predecessors lack of respect for the
country's democratic undertakings. 174
Neither has the army been particularly reform minded. For now,
senior officials within the military have judiciously refrained from exposing
too many of their grievances and, when they have, it has been in the most
circumspect manner. But, times are changing, and rapidly. In an interview
with senior members of the Coordinating Council of Officers Assemblies of
the Baltic Region, they expressed the opinion that the army has been
overwhelmed. They felt if the process of the Army's disintegration was not
stopped in the next three to five months, the army will be able to establish a
dictatorship, and Grachev will no longer have to say the army supports the
governments power. The army will take power itself. 175
There can be no question that the political situation, either in Russia,
or the events taking place in the Baltic States, can give rise to any warm
feelings over prospects of security, or regional stability. Both the Baltic States
and Russia have sought the help of various European and international
organizations such as the U. N., NATO, WEU, and CSCE to assist in resolving
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the human rights question 111 the Baltics. But, in as much as they have
looked to these organizations for their help, the fact remains that all sides
must be willing to negotiate and seek compromise. If, on the other hand,
Russia has no real intention of bargaining, but is simply stalling for time to
retain troops in the region, there is little outside organizations can do to
resolve the problem. 176
With ethnic tension and bloodshed occurring in numerous locations
on Russia's periphery, the idea of Russia as the "big brother" and the illusion
that ethnic nationalities could live in harmony with each other has been a
notion that is still, in Russia today, hard to shed. In an interview with
Andrei Zubov, a political scientist and expert in interethnic relations, he
believed that peoples of the former USSR are accustomed to coexistence. 177
One cannot dispute that they are probably accustomed to coexistence, but one
must also question if it has been an existence they like. It is easy to say you
agree when being prodded bv the pointy end of a bayonet.
Zubov feels that the ethnic statehood in the former USSR is absurd,
and sooner or later a federation will emerge. The Baltic States, he reasoned,
were close to economic collapse and he wondered if the masses are prepared
to sacrifice welfare for language and national culture. He continued, saying
any normal person who is prepared to sacrifice much for independence, but
doesn't want to go hungry will, upon reflection, see the need for
integration. i 78
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The Baltics on the one hand, and the Russians on the other, are
talking, but neither side is listening to what the other is saying.
Mr Zubov, however, may have been most prophetic when addressing
the issue of human rights and the possible direction this many faceted
problem could take when he responded to a question about the reemergence
of the USSR by saying, "the drama the Baltic republics are currently
experiencing derives from their desire to become part of Europe; however,
they are not conducting themselves as Europeans, above all with respect to
their ethnic minorities. Yet if they resolve the problem, and integrate
Russians, then they will willv-nilly gravitate to Russia and unity. If not, I fear
the Baltics, and I especially mean Estonia and Latvia, as the situation in
Lithuania is different, will become the theatre of the next conflict. Apartheid
never ends peacefully. "^9
This, sadly enough, would very much be to the liking of Russia's
military and other conservatives. It would represent a tremendous shift in
the direction of Russian foreign policy as well as present grave difficulties for
Western governments in pursuit of regional stability. It would also provide
the rationale necessary for Russian troops to maintain a presence in the
region and could usher in a new era of antagonism and polarity reminiscent
of the Cold War. Already things are cool. We can only hope that, in the
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